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ABSTRACT

The book, intended for senior high school students, is one of a series concerned with problems of world order. The bipolar system (domination of the international system through maintenance of a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union) is described and defined by presenting case studies of the Hungarian rebellion in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the Arab-Israeli War in 1973. For each crisis the history is described, the current situation is presented, and the effects on and stages of development in the bipolar system are appraised. The study guides at the end of each chapter are designed to help the student examine each case and evaluate the system. The booklet also suggests issues and topics for further exploration and identifies other cases to examine. The final chapters postulate changes in the balance of power in the future and possible solutions for obtaining world order. Key concepts are defined in a glossary. (CK)

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Crises in World Order

The Cold War and Beyond-- From Deterrence to Detente--to What?

An examination
of the bipolar system
during three crises:

Hungary, 1956
Cuba, 1962
Middle East, 1973

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Foreword

This book is one of a series concerned with problems of world order. Solution of these problems requires a world-wide approach—a global point of view. Nation-states acting separately cannot solve these problems.

The editors of this series assume five values for the establishment of a peaceful and just order throughout the world. These goals are:

(1) Violence should be limited and wars prevented.

(2) Levels of economic welfare should be raised around the world.

(3) Social justice should be extended to everyone.

(4) Opportunities for *all* individuals to participate in public decision-making should be broadened.

(5) The ecological balance of the global environment should be restored.

This book is concerned largely with the first of these values: limiting violence and preventing war. It examines three cases—the Hungarian rebellion of 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973—in light of the concept of BIPOLARITY. (Terms introduced in SMALL CAPITALS are discussed at the end of the book under "Key Concepts.")

A bipolar system is one which is dominated by two centers of military and economic power. Since the end of World War II, two SUPERPOWERS—the United States and the Soviet Union—have dominated world politics and have competed for the allegiance of the world's other nations.

Through the three case studies, this book raises some important issues:

- Is bipolarity an effective system for keeping world peace?
- Does the bipolar system increase or decrease international tension, violence, and war?
- What is happening to the bipolar system in today's world?
- What kind of system *could* or *should* replace the bipolar system?
- As the international system changes, will violence and war become more or less probable?
- What kind of changes in the international system would be most likely to limit violence and prevent war?

Bipolar World

Power has always been a crucial factor in world affairs. During many periods of history, a BALANCE OF POWER between rival nation-states has been considered necessary for maintaining international peace and security. Presumably, international rivals are discouraged from attacking each other as long as they are thought to be equal in military and economic strength. Guided by this factor, friendly nations have often entered into alliances with each other to equalize their power positions with rival nations.

Since World War II, world peace has depended largely on the actions of two competing superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and on their efforts to maintain a balance of power with each other. As a major part of this effort, each superpower has developed nuclear weapons capable of destroying not only its rival many times over—but the rest of the world as well.

The military strength of the two superpowers is supported by tremendous economic strength. The Soviet Union has a population of about 250 million and the largest land area of any political system on earth. Its natural resources—mineral resources, in particular—are huge.

The United States has a population of about 210 million and a smaller land area than the Soviet Union. But the United States has the world's greatest wealth in industrial and agricultural production, and has produced the highly sophisticated technology that makes possible computer science and the refinement of weapons.

The economic strength of both nations is a necessary basis for their military power. Modern weapons are not only enormously destructive —they are enormously expensive. It takes an economic giant to be able to afford superpower status. For example, the amount of money the United States government appropriates each year for the Defense Department is more than the total value of all goods and services produced each year on the entire continent of Africa. Compared to what the United States and the Soviet Union spend for defense, even highly developed Western European nations such as France and Great Britain can afford to put only tiny amounts of money into their military forces. Given such massive concentrations of economic and military power, it is clear why



Symbol of the Cold War: an intercontinental ballistic missile on display in Moscow. 1970. Every day the nations of the world spend close to $644 million dollars on armaments.

the United States and the Soviet Union have dominated world affairs since World War II.

The bipolar world that has developed because of this two-power dominance began to take shape soon after World War II ended. In 1945, Russia was starting to recover from the terrible losses suffered during the war. Its victorious armies were dominant in Eastern Europe. Some American officials were becoming suspicious about Soviet territorial ambitions in neighboring nations. Soviet leaders, for their part, feared that the United States meant to increase its own power and prestige at Russia's expense.

During the late 1940s, suspicion turned to outright distrust, and the COLD WAR began. Russia organized Communist governments in Bulgaria and Rumania—and took control of other Eastern European nations. The United States granted Greece and Turkey $400 million to resist communism.

The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949—four years after the United States had done so. Any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would now raise the possibility of atomic destruction on a massive scale. During the 1950s, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, warned publicly that

the United States would meet Communist aggression by "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons.

At the same time, however, a kind of bipolar war-prevention system was developing. It was not planned ahead of time. It grew, piece by piece, as a result of events, reactions and counter-reactions to events, and national policies on specific issues. By the 1960s the system had become clearly recognizable with definite features.

One feature of the system is MUTUAL DETERRENCE. In theory, if a bipolar system is to prevent a world war, each superpower must be strong enough so that neither will attack the other—because each knows that if it does so, it will be destroyed. The theory is often expressed as "mutually assured destruction" or MAD. Mutual deterrence of this kind works—as long as neither superpower can gain too great a military advantage over the other.

One result of this strategy, however, has been an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Every advance in military technology by one superpower has spurred the other to "catch up" by modernizing its own weapons.

Although the superpowers have followed a policy of peaceful COEXISTENCE—to the extent of holding back from direct armed conflict with each other—each has also tried to "outflank" the other by gaining the allegiance of smaller nations around the globe. Regional alliances and security pacts, military and economic aid programs, as well as outright

The F-14, an advanced U.S. fighter plane, costs over $10,000,000. For the same amount of money, UNICEF could provide a one-year high-protein supplement to half a million undernourished infants and children throughout the world.

subversion and intimidation of less powerful nations, are some of the tactics each superpower has used in trying to expand its own influence while trying to block the expansion of its rival.

The superpowers have thus created POWER BLOCS and SPHERES OF INTEREST among the world's nations. Each has tried to encroach as much as possible on the other's spheres of interest through propaganda, subversive activities, and other tactics. Yet each has recognized that there are certain limits to such encroachment if a direct clash between the superpowers is to be avoided. Recognition by superpower leaders of "where the limits are " is obviously crucial to peace and survival in an age of nuclear weapons.

A number of questions can be raised about the bipolar system and the way it operates. First of all, what is its purpose? Only to serve the national interest of the two superpowers—if necessary, at the expense of everyone else? Or does bipolarity serve in any way to promote world-order principles—in particular, the principle that violence should be limited and wars prevented?

How effectively *can* violence be limited and wars prevented in a bipolar world? For example, can mutual deterrence really be depended upon to prevent the ESCALATION of a crisis into armed conflict between the two superpowers? For how long? And under what conditions? Or, in regard to minor wars, is it easier or more difficult to limit their spread in a bipolar world? Does the bipolar system itself encourage minor wars, or does it discourage them?

Finally, how long will the international system continue to be dominated by two superpowers? Is the bipolar world already becoming a world of the past? China, for instance, shows signs of eventually emerging as a third superpower. Groups of nations, such as Western Europe and the oil-producing nations of the Middle East, have been able to exert great economic power.

Even in terms of military strength, many smaller nations are losing their awe of the superpowers. They are asking: How powerful is a nation, really, if its power consists chiefly of nuclear weapons which it is restrained from using? Meanwhile, more and more countries—such as India and China—are developing their own nuclear capabilities. Today, it is relatively easy to make nuclear weapons. Knowledgeable individuals could do it with the right equipment.

The conclusion to this book will discuss whether—and if so, how—the bipolar system is changing and what the changes might mean for world order. But first the operation of the bipolar system will be considered by examining three dramatic crises in world order. Each crisis occurred in a different decade: the Hungarian rebellion in 1956; the Cuban missile crisis

in 1962; the Arab-Israeli October war in 1973. Each marked a significant stage in the development of the bipolar system.

In this book, each crisis is presented as a case study, highlighting certain features of the bipolar system and showing how it worked—or did not work—in an actual situation. There are central questions you should ask about any crisis in world order: Did it have to happen that way? What were the alternatives? What should be the preferred alternatives?

To understand how the bipolar system operated during each crisis, think about the following questions as you read the case study:

(1) In which superpower's sphere of interest did the crisis occur?

(2) What was at stake for each superpower during the crisis?

(3) What did each superpower do to escalate and/or resolve the conflict?

(4) How did the deterrence theory operate in the crisis?

(5) How was the bipolar system effective in limiting violence and preventing war?

(6) How might the crisis have evolved under a system with more than two superpowers?

(7) Would such a system be preferable or do we need to consider other new alternatives?

As you examine each case with these questions in mind, you can be asking a larger question: What should the world be like in the future?

The Cold War

CASE ONE: 1956

The Cold War: 1945-1956

1945 — Soviet armed forces occupy Eastern Europe.
— Berlin is divided into four military-occupation zones (Russian, American, British, and French).
— The United States drops two atomic bombs on Japan.
— World War II ends; the United States and the Soviet Union emerge as the world's two major powers.
— United Nations Charter is adopted by fifty-one nations.
1947 — The Truman Doctrine is announced, asserting that it must be the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The United States pledges assistance (including military advisers) to Greece and Turkey to prevent Communist takeovers.
1948 — Berlin blockade goes into effect. The Soviets and East Germans shut off land access to the western zones of occupied Berlin. The blockade is lifted after the United States institutes a continuous airlift of supplies into the city.
1949 — North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military defense alliance, is formed by the United States, Canada, and a number of Western European nations.
— The Soviet Union explodes its first atomic bomb.
1950 — South Korea is invaded by North Korea. The Korean War begins, with the United States (and the United Nations) aiding South Korea, and the People's Republic of China aiding North Korea.
1952 — First thermonuclear hydrogen bomb is exploded by the United States. Destructive capacity is far greater than that of bombs dropped on Japan in 1945.
1953 — Soviet Premier Josef Stalin dies.
— Armistice ends fighting in Korea.
— The Soviet Union explodes a thermonuclear bomb.
1954 — The United States launches the first atomic-powered submarine.
— Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is formed as a collective-defense alliance among the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand.
1955 — Warsaw Pact, a mutual-defense treaty, is signed between the Soviet Union and the Soviet-bloc nations of Eastern Europe.
1956 — Polish workers revolt. Wladyslaw Gomulka is elected to head a Polish government partially independent of Russia.
— Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal, taking it over from Britain and France. Israel, Britain, and France invade Egypt. In the U.N. Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union join in condemning the attack.
— Hungarians rebel against Soviet domination.

The Hungarian Rebellion

From Demonstration to Rebellion

People were tense in Budapest, Hungary, on the foggy morning of October 23, 1956. Many pedestrians, hurrying along the damp sidewalks of the city's central boulevard, seemed to wear the same tense, expectant look. In the shops, no one chattered much. If something needed to be said, it was said quickly. Then the speaker would retreat again into uneasy silence.

At 10 A.M., a radio message announced a demonstration for that afternoon—one planned by university students and members of the Writers Union. Such a demonstration, everyone knew, could lead to open protest against the domination of Hungary by the Soviet Union, a domination backed by Soviet troops and Soviet tanks.

Just a few months earlier, in the nearby country of Poland, striking workers had battled Soviet tanks. The tanks won, but the Russians in the end gave ground to Polish NATIONALISM. They allowed Wladyslaw Gomulka to become First Secretary of the Polish Communist party. Gomulka, a "national Communist," believed in communism, but not under Russian rule.

Now there was a strong nationalist movement in Hungary as well. Perhaps it too would erupt into violence, possibly at the demonstration that very afternoon. And afterward? First Poland, then Hungary—it might be a chain reaction. One whole section of the bipolar world, Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, might fall apart.

The leaders of Hungary, both those in the government and those in the Communist party, owed their positions to the Soviet Union. On October

23 they held a meeting at noon and, within an hour, issued a communiqué banning the demonstration. But then representatives of student groups and the Writers Union persuaded the Minister of the Interior to permit the demonstration after all. In any case, people were already gathering, and there was no way the government could stop them, short of force.

At first the crowd numbered about 10,000 persons. They gathered before the statue of a Hungarian national hero, Sandor Petöfi, a nationalist poet and a fighter in the 1848 revolution against the Hapsburg rulers. Now in October 1956, poets were among the demonstrators, as well as students and their professors, and even some Hungarian soldiers.

No one in the crowd carried weapons, and the people were orderly. Students, however, waved Hungarian flags from which the Communist hammer and sickle had been cut out. Others waved Polish flags. An actor mounted a platform to read a Petöfi poem: "Rise, Hungarians, the Homeland calls. The time is now. Now or never. . . . We will never again be slaves." Before the reading was finished, the crowd had swelled to 50,000.

This mass of people now left the Petöfi statue and moved through the streets of Budapest. They crossed a bridge over the Danube, stopped to gather again before the statue of another hero of the 1848 revolution, and eventually arrived at the square in front of the Parliament Building. By now, they numbered more than 200,000. This was no longer just a demonstration.

During the afternoon, despite the size of the crowd, there had been very little violence. But at 8 P.M. the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist party, Gerö Erno addressed the nation by radio. He denounced the open display of Hungarian nationalism and praised "proletarian internationalism."

The effect was to send a wave of anger through the city. Those who had not heard the radio speech learned of it from others who had. Soon the crowd in front of the Parliament Building began shouting slogans against Gerö.

Meanwhile, some blocks away, groups of students and laborers were busy in Stalin Square. A huge metal statue of the Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin, dominated the square. With the aid of ropes and acetylene torches, the students and laborers worked to topple the colossus—until it pitched over onto the pavement. People took turns spitting on its face. Then a truck pulled up to drag the fallen statue clanking through the streets.

The first real battle of the night took place at the Radio Building. As the government's nerve center for electronic communication and propaganda, the building was well guarded. Its massive doors, made of thick wood reinforced by oak studs, could withstand almost anything except explosives. Behind the doors and the equally thick walls, squads of AVH

men—the hated political police—stood armed with machine guns. From the roof, two searchlights could play over the crowd, while the AVH men could fire at will through narrow openings in the walls.

The demonstrators had not really planned to capture the fortress. No one had planned much of anything that was happening in Budapest that evening. It happened almost spontaneously.

In the case of the Radio Building, trouble broke out when several students at the demonstration in Parliament Square decided to see if they could broadcast a list of demands. A large group of demonstrators followed the students to the Radio Building.

The AVH men inside the building laughed at the students' request, drove them off with tear gas, and turned on the searchlights. The crowd began throwing rocks at the searchlights. The AVH men responded with bullets. Several demonstrators were killed. A Hungarian Army officer in an armored vehicle called out to the AVH men to stop shooting. A machine gun opened fire, and he too was killed. The crowd backed off.

But word of the violence spread, and soon reinforcements for the demonstrators arrived. Truckloads of workers pulled up to the site—with guns and ammunition they had seized from munitions factories. Moving

Watched by clerks and customers of a butcher's shop, Hungarian rebels took aim at members of the secret police.

swiftly, they set up machine-gun emplacements and shot out the searchlights on the roof of the building.

An ambulance tried to drive through the crowd toward the building. Suspicious students stopped it. A quick search showed it to be loaded, not with medical supplies, but with guns and ammunition—and grenades. It was a trick to sneak in more arms for the AVH men. Someone shot the driver. Students passed the grenades out to demonstrators.

Grenade after grenade, hurled against the heavy doors, exploded. Finally the doors fell, and the demonstrators stormed into the building. It was an angry and vengeful crowd. Not many AVH men were taken prisoner. Most were shot on sight.

Within just a few hours, what had started as a demonstration had become a REBELLION. No one really led it. It was that rare thing: a truly democratic uprising. Many of the would-be revolutionaries—"Freedom Fighters" as they came to be called—were sixteen or younger. And during the fighting that took place within the next few days, 12-year-olds found themselves trying to blow up Russian tanks with homemade gasoline bombs. Surprisingly often, they succeeded.

By October 28, the first phase of the uprising came to an end. Russian tanks began withdrawing from Budapest, leaving the city to the insurgents. It seemed that the rebellion had succeeded.

Outside of Budapest, there had been little fighting in Hungary. Emphasis was on political reorganization. Hungarians got together, created Revolutionary Councils, took over government offices, and elected or appointed their own representatives from all walks of life. In most localities, the Revolutionary Councils were able to make deals with Soviet troops not to fight.

A United Nations Special Investigating Committee later declared: "No aspect of the Hungarian uprising expressed its democratic tendencies or its reaction to previous conditions more clearly than the creation of Revolutionary Councils in villages, towns, and on the county level. . . . Within a few days, these bodies came into existence all over Hungary. . . . Their chief purpose was to ensure for the Hungarian people real . . . control of local government." This local control was to be the basis of a true REVOLUTION, a real change in Hungarian government.

Background to Rebellion

The right to control their own country and its institutions was, for most Hungarians, the main reason they revolted. The spirit of nationalism —still an important force in world affairs—is deeply felt by many peoples of Eastern Europe. In Hungary, it is rooted in the country's history: in battles against the Ottoman Turks in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-

turies, and in resistance against the Austrian Hapsburgs in the 1800s. It is commemorated by statues and celebrated in songs and literature.

In the bipolar split that developed between the two superpowers after World War II, Hungary became part of the Soviet power bloc in Eastern Europe. During the war, when the United States and the U.S.S.R. were allied against the Axis powers, Soviet armed forces had occupied Hungary—and afterward they stayed.

Within three years, Hungary, like other countries of Eastern Europe, was transformed into a satellite of the Soviet Union. Its political and economic systems copied the Soviet Communist model, and its government was controlled by men put in power by the Soviet Union. Hungarian nationalism was suppressed.

There was nothing new in this subjugation of a small state by a more powerful one. Imperialism has long characterized the international system. Powerful nations have often established blocs of subordinate puppet states, and governed other lands as colonies. Soviet leaders also considered Eastern Europe a necessary buffer zone to protect Russia against another invasion from the west—like Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

Moreover, Josef Stalin and other Soviet leaders were hard-headed realists who looked at the world in terms of practical power relationships. From their point of view, the United States already had its own well-established sphere of interest which it dominated in the Western Hemisphere. And was not the United States ready to use its economic power to establish another sphere of interest in Western Europe?

As for the United Nations—was it really an international organization set up to protect the peace and security of all the world's peoples? Not in the Soviet view. Under conditions existing in the late 1940s, Stalin and other Soviet leaders felt the U.N. was dominated by the United States. How could Soviet interests be protected by such an organization?

This kind of suspicion and mistrust of the United States among Soviet leaders was balanced by equal suspicion and mistrust of the Soviet Union among United States leaders. These feelings laid the foundation for the Cold War and for the growth of a bipolar world.

But even in the late 1940s the bipolar world was "untidy." It was hardly a neat model of Communist nations supporting the Soviet Union, noncommunist nations supporting the United States—with neutral nations in between.

On the Communist side, in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union in 1948. The Yugoslav chief of state, Marshal Tito, was definitely a Communist. But he was also a strong and resourceful nationalist leader in his own right. He had no need of Russian troops to keep him in power. And he was not willing to have Yugoslavia be part of another nation's power bloc.

Tito was also an experienced guerrilla leader who had fought the Germans throughout much of World War II. Stalin, always a realist, was not willing to pay the price necessary to defeat Tito's forces in Yugoslavia's mountainous terrain. Thus Tito showed in 1948 that, under the right conditions, it was possible for a small nation to defy one of the superpowers—and get away with it.

Hungary had no leader like Tito. When the Russian troops marched into Hungary in 1944-45, they brought with them exiled Hungarian Communists and "re-educated" prisoners of war. One of the Communists was Matyas Rákosi who, with Russian help, gained control of the government by 1948.

A devout Stalinist, Rákosi proceeded quickly with the "Sovietization" of Hungary. Production quotas were raised, but wages were not. Emphasis was placed on heavy industry. The amount of capital invested in this area was so great that all other areas, such as consumer goods and agriculture, suffered. In addition, the Soviet Union exploited the resources of Hungary through trade arrangements and joint Hungarian-Soviet corporations. The Hungarian standard of living declined.

Police terror, typical of Stalin's Russia, also became a part of Hungarian life. The AVH—the political police—infiltrated every organization, always ready to inform on someone who might be disloyal to the regime. Because the AVH police were Hungarians, they were hated even more deeply than the Russians.

When Stalin died in 1953, events in the Communist world took a different turn. In the Soviet Union, a pattern of collective leadership emerged. Stalin had been both the head of the Communist party organization in the U.S.S.R. and premier, or head of government. After Stalin's death, Georgi Malenkov took over as premier, while Nikita Khrushchev became head of the Communist party. At the same time, there was some relaxation of Stalin's harsh policies.

Changes in Soviet policies led to changes in the policies of Hungary and the other Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Rákosi was ousted as premier, in favor of a more popular official, Imre Nagy.

For nearly two years, the Nagy government gave the people of Hungary a more liberal breathing spell. However, in 1955, when Nagy's Soviet sponsor, Georgi Malenkov, resigned, Nagy was soon forced out, and Rákosi regained his position as premier.

But the Hungarian people, after Nagy's liberal regime, would not accept a return to Rákosi's Stalinist policies. Hungarian intellectuals, led by the Writers Union, began to express their discontent. Soon the writers were joined by a second important group, the university students.

Students first demanded a restructuring of the universities to reduce the

amount of Communist indoctrination. They then began to hold debates on the larger issues that concerned the nation as a whole. These debates drew such large crowds, and focused the discontent of the people so clearly, that the Hungarian government finally banned such debates.

The extent of the unrest in Hungary also alarmed the Soviet Union. On July 18, 1956—one day after a Soviet representative came to Budapest—Rákosi resigned "for reasons of health" and left the country. But Soviet efforts to improve relations with Hungary went only halfway. Erno Gerö, one of Rákosi's disciples, was appointed to take his place. While Gerö was somewhat less extreme than his predecessor, the people would not accept him. They wanted the return of Imre Nagy and real political reform.

"Why Are Russian Troops Stationed in Our Country?"

Events came to a climax on October 22, one day before the actual revolt began. The scene was a mass meeting of the Communist Youth League at the Technological University in Budapest. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss student grievances and demands for educational reform. But as speaker after speaker droned on, the crowd of 4,000 became restless. Suddenly someone shouted out, "I would like to ask a question. Why are Russian troops stationed in our country?"

The meeting exploded. Everyone began shouting anti-Russian slogans. Gradually calm was restored, and the participants were able to formulate a list of demands. At 8:30 P.M., a delegation of students went to the headquarters of Radio Budapest to broadcast their demands.

The censors at the radio station were willing to approve only five of the demands for broadcast. But the delegation of students refused to be silenced. They returned to the mass meeting at the Technological University. Instead of being reduced, the list of demands was increased:

- We demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops.
- We demand the election of new leaders in the Hungarian Workers party . . . by secret ballot . . . These leaders should convene the party congress within the shortest possible time.
- The Government should be reconstituted under the leadership of Comrade Imre Nagy. All criminal leaders of the Stalinist-Rákosi era should be relieved of their posts at once.
- Matyas Rákosi . . . should be brought home and brought before a People's Court of Judgment.
- We demand general elections . . . with universal suffrage, secret ballot, and the participation of several parties . . .
- We demand that the workers should have the right to strike.

- We demand a re-examination and readjustment of Hungarian-Soviet . . . political, economic, and intellectual relations on the basis of complete political and economic equality and of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.
- We demand the reorganization of the entire economic life of Hungary.
- We demand the re-examination of all political and economic trials by independent courts and the release and rehabilitation of innocent persons.
- We demand complete freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of the press and a free radio.
- We demand that the Stalin statue—the symbol of the Stalinist tyranny and political oppression—should be removed as quickly as possible.
- The youth of the Technological University of Budapest unanimously express their complete solidarity with the Polish and Warsaw workers and youth in connection with the Polish national independence movement.

Students, professors, and workers who had joined the meeting labored all night to copy these demands and distribute them to the public. They also decided to hold a public demonstration the next day, October 23, in front of the Petöfi statue.

Though no one knew it yet, that demonstration would quickly lead to rebellion.

The Soviet Reaction

The fighting that broke out on October 23 presented Soviet leaders with an unpleasant choice. They could crush the rebellion and bring on the condemnation of the world—and possibly INTERVENTION of some kind by the United States. Or they could let Hungary have a measure of independence, as they had done with Poland.

Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish "national Communist" leader, had proved to be a strong personality and a clever politician. He knew just how far he could take Poland toward national independence—and where he would have to stop. "After all," Gomulka reminded the Poles, "our neighbors to the East are not Australian shepherds."

With Gomulka, the Russians calculated they might be able to risk a little "national independence" in Poland, and still not jeopardize the security of their power bloc in Eastern Europe.

But the man the Hungarians wanted was Imre Nagy. How far could the Russians trust Nagy to keep the situation under control? Might not the Hungarians do what Yugoslavia had done, and break with the Soviet bloc altogether—or even join the West?

The Russians, whose leader was now Nikita Khrushchev, decided to take a chance on Nagy—for the time being.

Two Russian officials arrived in Budapest by plane on October 24,

while fighting continued. Imre Nagy was made premier that same day. The next day, Erno Gerö resigned his post as leader of the Hungarian Communist party. He was replaced by Janos Kadar, a party official who had formerly opposed Rákosi's Stalinist regime.

On October 26, the Russian officials left Hungary to return to Moscow. Erno Gerö and his associates left the country as well. That afternoon, the Hungarian Communist party issued a proclamation giving in to the demands of the revolutionaries on a number of points. The party agreed to:

(1) The election of a new national government.

(2) Negotiations with the Soviet Government, on the basis of independence, complete equality, and non-intervention in internal affairs, to settle relations between the two countries. As a first step, Soviet troops would immediately withdraw.

(3) The granting of wage increases.

(4) An amnesty to all who had taken part in the armed battles.

That evening, the Budapest party committee issued a plea for calm and praised the new leadership—Nagy and Kadar—as the best hope for the future.

Two days later, there were more concessions to public demands. Nagy went on the radio to call for a cease-fire. He promised to carry out "the just demands of the people," including the raising of the minimum wage, construction of new housing, revitalization of agriculture, support for workers' councils, and help for students beginning new careers.

In another two days, on October 30, Imre Nagy made the following announcement:

In the interest of further democratization of the country's life, the cabinet abolishes the one-party system and places the country's government on the basis of democratic cooperation between coalition parties.

This provisional government has appealed to the Soviet General Command to begin immediately with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Budapest. At the same time, we wish to inform the people of Hungary that we are going to request the government of the Soviet Union to withdraw troops completely from the entire territory of the Hungarian Republic.

As they had been doing for two days, Soviet soldiers and tanks continued to withdraw from Budapest. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, however, kept a close watch on what was happening in Hungary.

They were also watching for Western reaction to events in Hungary —particularly the reaction of the other superpower, the United States of America. Would the Americans try to take advantage of the situation in Hungary?

If so, how would the Soviet Union respond? With the threat of nuclear war?

What *was* the United States reaction? Nothing. Americans were preoccupied with the final days of a Presidential election campaign between Adlai Stevenson and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Moreover, there was a crisis in the Middle East. The Suez Canal, formerly owned by the British and French, had recently been nationalized by Egypt. On October 29-31, British, French, and Israeli forces attacked Egypt.

The attention of the world was on Suez—not on Hungary.

In the U.N. Security Council, both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the attack on Suez and called for a cease-fire. While the two superpowers were cooperating over events in the Middle East —an area where they felt they shared a common interest—the United States was officially silent about the events unfolding in Hungary.

Soviet leaders interpreted the lack of American support for Hungary in just one way. Obviously, the United States considered Eastern Europe within the Soviet sphere of vital interests—and would not go out of the way to challenge the Soviet Union in this area. The Soviets had never been quite sure of this before. Now they were sure.

The Hungarians could expect no help from the West.

Khrushchev thought there might even be some room for bargaining. Suppose the Soviet Union offered to withdraw *all* its troops from Eastern Europe and to revise the terms of its military alliance in that area, the Warsaw Pact? Would the United States be willing to offer to withdraw *its* troops from Western Europe and revise the terms of the NATO Pact —the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military alliance? It was worth a try.

On October 30, the Soviet Union floated a "trial balloon." The government made a declaration, published in its *Pravda* newspaper the next morning, that Warsaw Pact troops—meaning Russian troops—were stationed in other nations only with the consent of the host nations. Consequently, the Soviet Union was willing to withdraw its troops from Budapest as soon as possible. In addition, the Soviet Union would open negotiations with *all* Warsaw Pact nations concerning the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

In the United States, President Eisenhower welcomed the Soviet statement. But he made no counterproposal. The President insisted, as he had many times before, that the United States meant no threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

So the Soviets now knew two things. First, the United States was willing to let them have a free hand in Eastern Europe. Second, the United States was not willing to revise the Western European military alliance.

At this point, the Hungarians were more than ever on their own.

The Revolutionaries Defeated

And in Hungary, Nagy was having trouble controlling his joyful countrymen. With the demands for domestic political reform being met, the emphasis of the "revolution" turned to foreign affairs. Revolutionary Councils all over the country were demanding that Nagy take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact—no matter what the Soviet reaction.

Thus, on October 31, Nagy announced he was opening negotiations to remove Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. That same day, Soviet officials returned to Budapest to discuss the situation. The meetings were reported to be amicable.

However, all through the night, Soviet tanks and troops—once

These Hungarian Freedom Fighters stood triumphant before a knocked-out Russian tank. Within a few days the Russians re-established military control over Hungary.

withdrawn—now moved back toward the Hungarian capital. On the morning of November 1, Nagy talked to the Soviet Ambassador about these movements. The Ambassador told Nagy to appoint two delegations, one political and one military, to discuss withdrawal of the troops. After his conversation with the Ambassador, Nagy called a meeting of Hungarian Communist leaders. He told them the troop movements violated the Warsaw Pact, and he recommended that Hungary repeal this treaty and declare her neutrality in the Cold War.

That afternoon Nagy informed the Soviet Ambassador of his government's decisions. He also sent a message to Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations, requesting that the problem of Hungary be placed on the Security Council agenda.

Later in the evening of November 1, something ominous occurred. Janos Kadar had taken part in discussions with the Soviet officials earlier in the afternoon, and was reported to have said that he would "fight Russian tanks with his hands." But sometime after 10 P.M. he was spirited away in an unidentified car and taken to the Soviet Embassy. He would not be heard from publicly until November 4.

Negotiations between Imre Nagy and the Soviet Ambassador continued on November 2. The Hungarian premier sent another telegram to the United Nations requesting the situation be considered by the Security Council.

On the afternoon of November 3, a Hungarian military delegation began talks with the Soviet military staff at the Parliament Building on the question of troop withdrawal. In the meantime, Soviet military forces had surrounded all the vital airfields, effectively grounding the Hungarian Air Force. By the night of November 3, Soviet tanks were poised in a crescent to the east of Budapest.

The joint Hungarian-Soviet talks on troop withdrawal, now moved to Soviet headquarters, continued until midnight. The Hungarian delegation at the talks remained in telephone contact with Nagy. Then the chief of the security police of the Russian forces burst into the meeting and arrested the entire group of Hungarians.

They were never heard from again.

Sometime near dawn on November 4, the Yugoslav Embassy warned Nagy and other government officials that the Russians were on the move. At 5:20 A.M. Nagy went on radio to announce the Russian moves and to inform the people that Hungarian troops would fight. Shortly thereafter, Nagy and a group of his followers were granted asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy.

There were a few final pro-Nagy messages broadcast from Budapest. One called on the Soviet Army to avoid bloodshed. And the last broadcast was an appeal from the Writers Union for outside help:

This is the Association of Hungarian Writers speaking to all writers, scientists, all writers' associations, academies, and scientific unions of the world. We turn to the leaders of intellectual life in all countries. Our time is limited. You all know the facts. There is no need to expand on them. Help Hungary! Help the Hungarian writers, scientists, workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Help! Help! Help!

This message was broadcast at 7:56 A.M. It was repeated in Russian and German, and then music was played. At 8:10 A.M. the radio went off the air. But for the rest of the day, free radio stations all over Hungary appealed to the West and to the United Nations for support.

The appeals went unanswered. Roadblocks were set up to try to stop the Soviet tanks, but Budapest had no real plan for defense. Even if there had been a plan, the Hungarians could not have won against Soviet military might. Nevertheless, the Hungarians fought valiantly. In some areas, they were able to hold off the Russians for over a week.

As Budapest was being invaded by the Soviet tanks, a voice came over a radio station from somewhere in eastern Hungary. It announced the formation of a new government. An open letter was read to the Hungarian people stating that Janos Kadar and others had broken with the Nagy government on November 1. This step was taken, the letter said, because Nagy's government had fallen under the influence of reactionary elements.

Less than an hour later, Kadar named the members of his "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government," and told the people of his program. As one government crumbled under the pressure of Soviet military strength, another was being formed to ride into Budapest with the tanks. Thus ended the Hungarian rebellion.

During the next month, the borders with Austria and Yugoslavia remained open. About 200,000 people—2 percent of the country's entire population—escaped to the West.

The events in Hungary, so disastrous for the cause of Hungarian independence, strengthened the bipolar system. The Russians now knew that even though American leaders might condemn Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, the United States would not actively try to stop such actions. The principle that each superpower had its own sphere of interest, recognized by the other superpower, became more clearly established.

New, mutually understood PERCEPTIONS began to develop among the leaders of the superpowers on what was—and was not—worth the risk of nuclear war. With this development came a measure of stability in the bipolar system.

Yet six years after the Hungarian rebellion, the Cuban missile crisis would test the stability of the bipolar world in a way that made many people wonder how "safe" the system really was.

Examining the Case

1. Do you think the United States should have gone to the aid of Hungary? What could the United States have done? Why do you think American leaders did nothing beyond expressing sympathy for the Hungarians and indignation at the Russians?

2. Do you think the United Nations should have intervened in Hungary? If so, how? For what reasons?

3. Why do you think Soviet leaders decided to crush the Hungarian rebellion? From the Soviet point of view, what was at stake?

4. How much danger do you think there was of the Hungarian rebellion escalating into a confrontation between the two superpowers? To what degree do you think mutual deterrence worked to keep this from happening?

Evaluating the System

1. What did the Hungarian uprising prove to the Soviet Union about the limits of American actions in a bipolar world? Compare the responses of the two superpowers to the simultaneous events in Hungary and Suez. What did the two situations illustrate about the ability of the bipolar system to limit international conflict?

2. Does the Soviet response to the Hungarian rebellion indicate that there are limits to how much a superpower can control events—even within its own sphere of interest? If so, how would you describe these limits?

3. What degree of protection does a bipolar world offer to peoples like the Hungarians who wish to be free from the domination of other nation-states?

4. In what ways do you think the international system would have to change in order to protect small nations from invasion?

Issues and Topics for Further Exploration

This case study, like others in this book, provides an overview of just one incident in the Cold War. Readers interested in a deeper examination of the case and a broader evaluation of the bipolar system might want to explore these issues:

1. The role of students, writers, and other artists in political dissent. (This issue is crucial because of the ideological aspects of the Cold War when viewed as a world-wide struggle between communism and capitalism.

Look especially into the experience of Soviet poets and novelists speaking out for human rights and of American students protesting against the Vietnam war.)

2. Nonviolent alternatives as means of political dissent or tactics for revolution.

Other Cases to Examine

1. The Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
2. The American military action in Dominican Republic, 1965.

The Cold War

CASE TWO: 1962

The Cold War: 1957-1962

1957 — The Soviet Union launches the first man-made space satellite.
— Great Britain explodes its first hydrogen bomb.
1958 — The United States launches its first man-made satellite. The United States and the Soviet Union begin an all-out arms race to build up their intercontinental ballistic-missile systems.
— The United States sends troops to Lebanon to forestall a possible Communist effort to overthrow the Lebanese government.
1959 — Fidel Castro takes control of the government in Cuba after six years of revolutionary activity and guerrilla warfare.
— During a "Cold War thaw," Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visits the United States.
1960 — France explodes its first nuclear device.
1961 — East Germany closes the border between East and West Berlin and builds a wall across the city.
— The Soviet Union and China split openly. East European country of Albania sides with China.
1962 — The Soviet Union attempts to install offensive-missile bases in Cuba, leading to a confrontation with the United States.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Suddenly—Confrontation

An air of crisis hung over Washington throughout the Sunday of October 21, 1962.

The day before, President John Kennedy had abruptly ended an election-campaign tour on behalf of Congressional candidates. He had returned to Washington with the statement that he was suffering from a "slight cold."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk had remained in the capital, presumably to cope with a backlog of work that had accumulated because of his long talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko during the weekend. There were reports of high-level activities within the Kennedy Administration, and speculation about an impending crisis, possibly in Cuba.

On October 19 the United States had sent a squadron of the Navy's best fighter aircraft to Key West, Florida, only 90 miles from Cuba. On October 21 itself, United States amphibious vessels left Norfolk, Virginia, to join some 40 ships and 20,000 sailors and Marines "in order to take part in a training exercise" near Puerto Rico.

The next day, October 22, White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger announced that President Kennedy would speak that evening on radio and television. Meanwhile, ambassadors from both NATO and Latin American countries met at the White House to be briefed on President Kennedy's speech—which was said to be "on a subject of the highest national importance." Military jets brought Congressional leaders from all around the nation to a conference with the President. Many of

them took the unprecedented step of interrupting crucial political campaigns. When they left the White House, their faces were tense with an almost desperate concern. That evening, the world found out why.

The speech President Kennedy delivered over radio and television was a startling one. He announced that American intelligence had detected, on the island of Cuba, Soviet missile sites in various stages or preparation. His evidence was in the form of aerial photographs taken at high altitudes by U.S. reconnaissance planes. These photographs revealed the presence of medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000 miles. They also revealed additional sites—not yet completed—designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could reach a distance of approximately 2,200 miles. The latter, Kennedy said, could strike as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. Soviet nuclear weapons, it appeared, were trained directly on targets in the United States!

Earlier, Premier Nikita Khrushchev had stated that the Soviet Union had no need of missiles in Cuba because the U.S.S.R. had the capability of hitting the United States effectively from missile sites in its own country. But now, Kennedy said, the United States had received conclusive evidence that offensive msisile sites *were* being built in Cuba.

In his speech, the President announced the following plan of action:

(1) The establishment of a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment being shipped to Cuba. All ships bound for Cuba from any port would be turned back if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons.

President Kennedy's television address. Fearing nuclear war between the superpowers, many Americans began to turn their basements into bomb shelters.

(2) The quarantine would not apply to drugs, medicines, food, or other necessities of life. Petroleum, oil, and other lubricants were also not included in the quarantine.

(3) The U.S. military base at Guantanamo in Cuba would be reinforced and placed on a stand-by basis. Dependents of military personnel would be evacuated.

(4) The Soviet Union would be told that if any nuclear missile were launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere, the move would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States. The United States would then engage in "a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."

(5) Close surveillance of the military build-up in Cuba would be continued and increased.

(6) A meeting of the Organization of American States would be called to consider threats to hemispheric security.

(7) The United States would request an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. The United States would place before the Security Council a resolution asking for the prompt withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers. The Soviet Union would have to comply with these provisions before the U.S. quarantine could be lifted.

The immediate effect of this announcement on those who heard it was stunned silence—and fear. Clarifying statements by other American officials did nothing to relieve that fear.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was asked what the Navy would do if Soviet ships bound for Cuba entered the quarantined waters.

"If they stop," McNamara said, "we will send a boarding party on board . . . to search the cargo. In the event that there is no indication of offensive weapons on board, the ship will proceed. If there is an indication of offensive weapons on board, the captain . . . will be given the option of proceeding to any port he chooses other than a port of Cuba. If he refuses to change his course, we will use force."

What would be Nikita Khrushchev's reaction to President Kennedy's announcement? U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball analyzed the situation for a reporter: "Is he going to abide by the quarantine that we are about to establish with our Latin American colleagues and allies? Is he going to try to run that quarantine, to break it? Is he going to try to reply somewhere else in the world?" In any case, Ball said: "We are prepared." What would happen if Khrushchev did try to challenge the quarantine?

There had often been talk of the possibility of confrontation between the two superpowers. But up to this point in the Cold War, the possibility seemed remote. Now, suddenly, nuclear confrontation seemed imminent.

Crisis in the Making

The roots of the Cuban missile crisis reach deep into history. Just as the Soviet Union thought of Eastern Europe as within its sphere of interest,

the United States had long considered the Caribbean Sea as an "American lake." As early as 1807, Thomas Jefferson expressed the hope that "Cuba would add itself to our Confederation."

In 1823, President James Monroe announced his famous Monroe Doctrine. Of the European nations, he stated: "We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" and "as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

Later in the nineteenth century, the United States undertook to put some teeth into the Monroe Doctrine. Some Latin American countries, however, found U.S. actions under the doctrine more imperialistic than protective.

Cuba was a case in point. In 1898, as rebels fought to gain Cuba's independence from Spain, the U.S. battleship *Maine* sailed to Cuba. When the *Maine* mysteriously exploded, the result was the Spanish-American War.

The Treaty of Paris, which ended the war and "freed" Cuba, was negotiated by the United States and Spain without Cuban representation. An American military government ruled the island until 1902. When American forces were at last withdrawn, the Platt Amendment was made part of the Cuban constitution. This amendment gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuban internal affairs and the right to lease or purchase naval bases on Cuban territory, such as the base at Guantanamo.

The United States did not give up its right to intervene in Cuban affairs until 1934, when President Franklin Roosevelt sought to establish his Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. Throughout Roosevelt's presidency, however, the United States also supported dictatorships in Cuba including that of Fulgencio Batista. In fact, it was not until 1958 that the United States withdrew that support. By then, it was clear—to Cubans and Americans alike—that the revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro would succeed.

After a long struggle, which began in July 1953, Castro took control of Cuba in January of 1959. At first, relations between the United States and Castro's government were cordial. The United States recognized the new government. And when Castro visited the United States in April 1959, he was given a friendly though cautious reception.

Castro's regime was not anti-United States. Nevertheless, U.S. aid to the Batista government, the dominant influence of U.S. businessmen in Cuba, and a history of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean had left a legacy of distrust.

Castro launched a program of drastic economic reforms by seizing the U.S.-owned telephone company. In May 1959, he passed the Agrarian

For more than 70 years, the U.S. has maintained a military presence in Cuba—the Guantanamo naval base.

Reform Law under which no foreigner could acquire land in Cuba. No one could own both land and sugar mills. The United States Embassy in Havana protested—but without effect.

In need of aid for Cuba's ailing economy, Castro began to rely more and more on the pro-Soviet members of his government. Members of the

Cuban Communist party began to move into positions of power.

Cuban diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had been broken under the Batista government, were restored in May 1960. As relations between Cuba and the United States grew worse, Castro worried about American intervention and turned more and more to the Soviet Union. Premier Nikita Khrushchev welcomed this and warned that the Soviet Union would protect Cuba against United States intervention—by using missiles if necessary.

Cuba was becoming a pawn in the bipolar competition between the two superpowers.

The Cuban government began to seize not only land but also oil refineries owned by U.S. companies. In July, President Eisenhower reduced the Cuban sugar quota purchased by the United States. Cuba responded by nationalizing the sugar industry and increasing its sugar exports to the Soviet Union. In August 1960, Castro completed the nationalization of U.S. property. In October 1960, President Eisenhower put an embargo on all exports to Cuba except food and medicine.

In January 1961, Castro demanded a cut in the United States Embassy staff from 87 to 11 persons, on the ground that most of the staff were FBI and Pentagon spies. President Eisenhower immediately severed all diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Bay of Pigs Invasion and Aftermath

That same month, John Kennedy took office as President. Kennedy knew that the Eisenhower Administration had considered various plans for overthrowing Castro with the help of Cuban exiles. He inherited from Eisenhower a force of Cuban exiles under American training in Guatemala. He also inherited a committee of Cuban politicians under American influence in Florida—as well as a plan to employ exiles in an invasion of Cuba in order to establish a provisional government. The new President had hardly settled down in his White House office before he was presented with a proposal for the invasion.

At a news conference on April 12, 1961, Kennedy emphasized that United States armed forces would not be used to overthrow Castro's regime. He said he would oppose any attempt by Cuban exiles to mount an attack against Castro from the United States.

Despite these assurances, an invasion of Cuba *was* attempted just five days later by Cuban exiles trained by the United States Army and the Central Intelligence Agency. The force of about 1,500 Cubans landed at a spot called the Bay of Pigs.

Though Kennedy let the invasion proceed, he balked at supplying the

necessary U.S. military support. Nor did the small group of invaders receive any support from the Cuban people. Instead, they met a miserable defeat at the hands of Castro's army.

Castro now claimed that the invasion proved he had every right to fear United States aggression. Proclaiming the Cuban Republic a socialist state, Castro declared: "If Mr. Kennedy does not like socialism, well, we do not like imperialism, we do not like capitalism! We have as much right to protest over the existence of an imperialist-capitalist regime ninety miles from our coast as he feels he has to protest over the existence of a socialist regime ninety miles from his coast."

The Kennedy Administration, for its part, established two new policies. One was to isolate Cuba economically and politically from the rest of Latin America, in part by using United States influence in the Organization of American States, the regional organization which includes the United States and the Latin American countries. In the 1950s, the OAS had been dominated by the United States.

The other U.S. policy was to offer a new program, the Alliance for Progress, to encourage social and economic reform in Latin America. The Alliance, it was hoped, would diminish the appeal of Castroism, and perhaps even win Latin American governments over to an anti-Castro policy.

When the foreign ministers of the OAS met in Uruguay in January 1962, they voted to expel the Cuban government from active membership in the OAS. However, six nations, representing 70 percent of the population of Latin America, abstained from voting.

In February 1962, the United States government extended the embargo on American trade with Cuba to include Cuban tobacco. Drugs, medicines, and foods were not affected.

It was in this atmosphere of growing tension that a Soviet weapons build-up began in Cuba in the summer of 1962. In July, American intelligence reported an unusually large number of Soviet ships going to and from Cuba. The number increased in August. They carried military equipment, including anti-aircraft missiles.

Soviet military aid to Cuba created a dilemma for the Kennedy Administration. The President knew that he could not do very much about it without causing an international incident. But he was also under growing pressure at home from his Republican opponents to counter Communist inroads into the Western Hemisphere.

Much of the political debate centered on whether Soviet strategic objectives in Cuba were "defensive" or "offensive." Administration spokesmen affirmed their intent not to permit the Russians to establish a base there for "offensive" purposes.

But now, on October 14, aerial photographs secretly taken by U.S.

planes showed that an offensive-missile base was exactly what the Russians *were* building.

Dealing with the Crisis

For a week after the discovery of Soviet missile-site construction in Cuba, there were secret high-level discussions in Washington. How should the United States respond?

Kennedy and his advisers dismissed the idea of relying solely on the United Nations. They felt that time did not permit that kind of leisurely discussion. Something had to be done before the missiles became fully operational. Moreover, at that time, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., Valerian Zorin, presided over the Security Council. He could not be expected to view the American case with complete objectivity.

It was finally decided to refer the crisis both to the U.N. and to the Organization of American States—and at the same time to take unilateral action. Three types of unilateral response were seriously discussed: a surprise air strike to wipe out the missile sites, an invasion, a naval blockade.

Another approach discussed was just to do nothing. After all, it could be argued that missiles in Cuba were no more a threat to the United States than were intercontinental ballistic missiles based in the Soviet Union. Then, too, if the Russians had learned to live with American missiles in neighboring Turkey, couldn't the United States adjust to Soviet missiles in nearby Cuba?

President Kennedy and his advisers came up with three reasons for rejecting a do-nothing policy. The political situation in the United States was, although unstated, one reason. A Congressional election was less than a month away.

For months, the Republican party had been pressing the Democrats to take a harder line on Cuba. Senator Kenneth Keating, a Republican from New York, had insisted, long before President Kennedy received his conclusive evidence, that offensive missiles were present in Cuba.

Kennedy had replied that he could not base his foreign policy on rumor—and that he would act positively on any occasion when he had clear evidence that Cuba had acquired offensive weapons. Thus Kennedy had publicly committed himself in advance to some kind of positive response. A do-nothing policy would have been politically disastrous.

A second factor influencing the Kennedy Administration was the secrecy which cloaked the Soviet build-up in Cuba. Soviet officials —including Premier Khrushchev—had regularly denied any intent to place in Cuba missiles with a capacity to strike American cities. Did the Russians hope to get the missiles in place—and then use them as a

bargaining chip in the bipolar struggle? Would the Soviet Union now try, for example, to force the United States to remove its military bases nearest the U.S.S.R.?

Third, Kennedy was concerned about the psychological effect in Latin America of permitting such Soviet action. In his book *Kennedy*, Theodore Sorenson stated the President's view: "Missiles on Soviet territory or submarines were very different from missiles in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in their political and psychological effect on Latin America. The history of Soviet intentions toward smaller nations was very different from our own. Such a step, if accepted, would be followed by more; and the President's September pledge of action clearly called this step unacceptable."

So, when the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba became an established fact, the Kennedy Administration decided to act. The President seriously considered an air strike to destroy the missiles. But an air strike would kill not only Cubans but also Russian military personnel on the missile sites. Premier Khrushchev was perceived as an excitable personality who might react angrily to such an event.

So Kennedy chose a quarantine. This would make clear American determination, but give everybody time to consider the situation.

The President did not completely abandon the idea of an air strike—or even an invasion. Kennedy made clear in talks with his advisers that he regarded such measures as alternatives to which he might turn if the quarantine failed and the crisis escalated.

The Crisis and World Opinion

In the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, each power tried to line up other countries on its side. The United States was particularly concerned about Latin America. Intervention from the north had long been a source of Latin American resentment. So when Kennedy and his advisers considered a quarantine and other options, they were worried over possible Latin American response to such unilateral action.

Kennedy's approach was to call for a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States. The OAS could take action under the Rio Treaty, which committed the members of the OAS to act together in order to meet armed attacks and threats of aggression against any American state.

On the afternoon of October 23, the OAS Council passed a resolution (by a vote of 19-0) which, in effect, supported the U.S. action. Kennedy waited until the OAS had voted and then officially proclaimed a quarantine against the shipment of missiles and other offensive weapons to Cuba. At the same time, the United States announced that a vast armada

of American ships and aircraft was on patrol off Cuba, and that they would stop and search all ships headed for Cuban ports. Those whose cargo included missiles and other offensive weapons would be turned back.

The Soviet Union responded by canceling all military leaves. Like the United States, it requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. The eleven-member Security Council met to hear conflicting charges of aggression.

The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, stated that the transformation of Cuba into a base for offensive weapons constituted a threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere and to the peace of the world. Cuba, he claimed, had given the Soviet Union a bridgehead and a staging area in the Western Hemisphere. Stevenson went on to say that by setting up missiles in Cuba, the U.S.S.R. was striking at the principle of the territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere. To let that challenge go unanswered would be to undermine a basic and historic pillar of the hemisphere's security.

The Cuban Ambassador asserted that the United States held the only foreign base in Cuba, at Guantanamo—against the will of the Cuban people.

The Soviet Ambassador denied that the weapons in Cuba were offensive in nature. The naval blockade, imposed without a declaration of war, was a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and principles of international law. The United States by resorting to a naked gamble, he said, had taken a step towards the unleashing of a thermonuclear war.

Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General U Thant worked behind the scenes to avert the outbreak of a large-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union. His efforts were spurred by the fear of a direct clash resulting from the American quarantine. The quarantine had begun on the afternoon of October 24. At the same time, twenty-five Soviet cargo ships, with an escort of six submarines, were on their way to Cuba. An American attempt to stop and inspect their cargo could begin a thermonuclear war.

U Thant urged both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. Pending a peaceful solution of the problem, he proposed a voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba and a voluntary suspension of the quarantine.

On October 25, Khrushchev responded to U Thant's letter with the comment that he agreed with "your proposal, which accords with the interests of peace." Kennedy indicated on the same day that Ambassador Stevenson was "prepared to discuss these arrangements with you."

U Thant repeated his appeal to Khrushchev not to allow Soviet ships to

October 1962: Nuclear alert. U.S. bombers were stationed at Logan International Airport in Boston in preparation for a possible air strike to wipe out Soviet missile bases.

challenge the blockade. Simultaneously, he urged Kennedy to issue instructions to American vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid a direct confrontation with Soviet ships "in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident."

Kennedy replied to U Thant that there would be no confrontation if Soviet vessels kept away from the quarantine area. Khrushchev's answer to U Thant indicated that Soviet ships had been ordered to stay away from the interception area. Later in the week, American authorities learned that most of the Soviet ships had turned back.

Although a naval confrontation had for a time been avoided, the crisis was not over. From an American point of view, the news continued to be bad. Intelligence reports indicated that Soviet efforts to put the Cuban missile sites into operation had been speeded up. The fear and tension continued.

In Washington, plans for air strikes or an invasion now moved ahead rapidly. Men and equipment were moved into place. During these preparations, a new Soviet ship was reported on its way to Cuba. Two low-flying U.S. reconnaissance planes and a high-flying U-2 were shot down over the island. Each incident was the potential spark of a major conflagration.

End of the Crisis

Just when tensions were at their highest, Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev dated October 26. The Soviet Premier suggested that Soviet missiles in Cuba would be dismantled and shipped back to Russia if the United States would discontinue its quarantine and guarantee that Cuba would not be invaded.

This was a sudden and unexpected turn of events. While Kennedy and his aides were formulating a reply, another letter, dated October 27, arrived from Khrushchev. In this letter, Khrushchev noted that the U.S.S.R. was as disturbed by United States missiles in Turkey as the United States was by Soviet missiles in Cuba. He proposed the withdrawal of missiles from NATO bases in Turkey at the same time that the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba.

The additional condition of the second letter posed a problem for Washington. Which condition did Khrushchev perceive to be most crucial?

Kennedy chose to reply to the first letter. In his reply he maintained that the first ingredient necessary to resolve the crisis was "cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security,

would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and grave risk to the peace of the world."

On October 28, Khrushchev reverted to the terms he had first suggested. He agreed to order work on the missile sites halted, to crate and return to Russia the missiles already in Cuba, and to have this action verified by the United Nations. Soon after receiving this message, Kennedy, in a nation-wide television broadcast, congratulated Premier Khrushchev on his "statesmanlike decision."

Some details remained to be settled. Castro, for instance, was unhappy. Most people in Cuba had been proud to have missiles in their country. "Now the United States will not dare bother us!" was the general sentiment. But the Cubans were not pleased with the Russians' attitude. The Russians would not even let Cubans on the missile bases. And when Khrushchev decided to remove the missiles, Castro was merely informed of the decision—not consulted.

Castro refused, therefore, to permit U.N. observers on Cuban soil to verify that the bases had been dismantled. Another means of verification had to be found. It was eventually agreed that aerial photography, plus a search of ships bound from Cuba to Russia, would be enough.

"Which side triumphed? Who won?" asked Khrushchev afterward. He answered his own question this way: "One may say that it was sanity, the cause of peace and security of peoples, that won. Both sides displayed a sober approach and took into account that unless such steps are taken as could help to overcome the dangerous development of events, a World War III might break out."

President Kennedy, however, had a somewhat different opinion: "What is of concern is the fact that both governments were so far out of contact, really. I don't think that we expected that Khrushchev would put the missiles in Cuba, because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take, as it was later proved. Now, he obviously must have thought that he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it. So that he did not judge our intentions accurately.

"Well, now, if you look at the history of this century . . . when you look at all those misjudgments which brought on war, and then you see the Soviet Union and the United States, so far separated in their beliefs . . . and you put the nuclear equation into that struggle; that is what makes this . . . such a dangerous time. . . . One mistake can make this whole thing blow up."

Examining the Case

1. Contrast and compare the circumstances, events, and outcomes of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Hungarian rebellion of 1956. Which factors were similar and which were different? In whose sphere of interest did each crisis occur? What bearing did this factor have on the responses of the superpowers to each crisis? What does this suggest about the bipolar system?

2. How much of a voice do you think Castro had in the decision-making process that determined the course of the Cuban crisis? Do you think Kennedy or Khrushchev took the interests of the Cuban people into consideration in responding to the crisis?

3. Do you think "personalities" were important in the Cuban crisis? How do you think President Kennedy perceived Premier Khrushchev? What was Khrushchev's view of the American President?

4. On what grounds did the Kennedy Administration choose the course it took in responding to the placement of missiles in Cuba? What was at stake for the United States? Do you think we are safe in having the question of thermonuclear war decided on such grounds?

5. What role did the United Nations play in the Cuban missile crisis? How decisive was that role? What other roles might it have played? What factors led to the role it did play? Would a different role have been preferable?

Evaluating the System

1. Do you think the Cuban missile crisis proved the effectiveness of "mutual deterrence" as a peacekeeping mechanism? What might have happened if Premier Khrushchev had *not* been convinced that the United States was determined to wage war, if necessary, to keep Soviet missiles out of Cuba?

2. Why might the two superpowers be reluctant to submit a conflict situation like the Cuban missile crisis to the U.N. for settlement? What would each superpower have to give up in order to do that?

Issues and Topics for Further Exploration

1. The effect of the Cuban Revolution on U.S. power in the Western Hemisphere. (Did Castroism weaken the U.S. position in the ideological struggle?)

2. Soviet relations with nationalist leaders of the Third World such as Castro, and Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam.

The Cold War

CASE THREE: 1973

The Cold War: 1963-1973

1963 — Direct telephone connection—the "hot line"—is installed between the White House and the Kremlin.
— Treaty is signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain banning all nuclear tests above ground.

1964 — Nikita Khrushchev is forced to resign his leadership positions in the Soviet Union, and is replaced by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin.
— China explodes its first atomic bomb.

1965 — The United States sends Marines to the Dominican Republic, claiming the action to be necessary to forestall a possible Communist takeover.

1966 — French President Charles de Gaulle asserts French independence from U.S. policy by withdrawing all French armed forces from the NATO alliance.

1967 — Israel smashes Arab forces in a six-day Mideast war (the third Arab-Israeli war) after which the Soviet Union begins helping the Arabs to rebuild their military forces.

1968 — Czechoslovakia's attempts to liberalize its government and society are crushed by Soviet military invasion.

1969 — The United States and the Soviet Union begin talks on limiting strategic arms.

1971 — People's Republic of China is granted membership in the United Nations.

1972 — United States President Richard Nixon visits People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
— The United States and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on limiting some strategic arms.

1973 — United States and People's Republic of China set up liaison offices.
— The Soviet Union and West Germany sign a ten-year pact for economic and technical cooperation.
— Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev visits the United States for talks with President Richard Nixon.
— Egyptian and Syrian forces attack Israel in October to begin a new Mideast war (the fourth such war since 1948).

The Arab-Israeli War

Again Confrontation?

It was not yet dawn in Washington on Thursday morning, October 25, 1973. Throughout the world, thousands of American military personnel were rushing back to their bases.

In the United States, one speeding car was stopped by a policeman. The driver, an Army sergeant, explained his hurry.

Later, at the police station, a reporter on the lookout for a story read the sergeant's explanation in the police blotter—and got a story he had not expected.

By 7 A.M., eastern daylight time, Americans turning on the morning news got the story, too: United States armed forces had been placed on a world-wide "precautionary" alert. What happened next would depend on the Soviet Union.

The immediate danger area was the Middle East, an area in which the United States supported Israel and the Soviet Union supported the Arabs. On October 6, fighting had broken out between Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria. The two superpowers both entered the conflict indirectly—feeding supplies and military equipment into the war to the opposing sides.

Such a situation in a bipolar world involves an obvious risk that the conflict will escalate into direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

Yet, until now, it had seemed that they would avoid that risk. On October 22, they had co-sponsored a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a Mideast cease-fire. Backed by both superpowers, the resolution passed quickly. The affirmative vote was 14–0.

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Moreover, the whole atmosphere surrounding relations between the Soviet Union and the United States during the past several years had been one of DÉTENTE—a French word meaning a relaxation of tensions. Agreements had been reached between the two countries in 1972 and 1973 which concerned trade, plans for a joint space flight, and cooperation in various areas of science and health and environmental problems.

In 1972, Richard Nixon had become the first American President ever to visit Moscow. While there, he and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, held talks on an arms limitation treaty, hopefully a first step toward further arms reductions. A formal agreement was signed later that year.

In 1973, less than four months before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, Brezhnev had visited the United States. The visit was marked by a spirit of friendliness. An agreement was signed which bound the two superpowers to enter into immediate consultation if any situation arose that appeared "to involve risk of nuclear conflict."

Perhaps, at last, the Cold War was over and the ground was being laid for a new era of bipolar cooperation. But when Brezhnev was still in the United States, he pointed to the Middle East as one area where differences of interest still existed between the two superpowers.

On October 25—despite the spirit of *détente* and the joint Soviet-American resolution for a cease-fire—the United States and the U.S.S.R. were once again eyeing each other like two gunfighters in a Western movie.

The sudden confrontation came about because both Egypt and Israel had violated the cease-fire. Israel quickly made significant military gains. This the Soviet Union would not tolerate. Russian airborne units prepared for action. Russian ships moved from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union informed the United States that it was ready to send its own forces into the Mideast war zone to enforce the cease-fire—a move which would effectively hold the Israelis in check.

This the United States would not tolerate. Thus American forces were put on world-wide alert. If the Soviet Union sent troops to the Middle East, a collision with the United States seemed certain. The world had before it another illustration of how quickly bipolar cooperation can turn into bipolar conflict—when competing national interests are at stake.

Source of the Middle East Dilemma

The chief cause of Middle East unrest—antagonism between the Arab nations and Israel—is rooted in an international system which, for the most part, no longer exists. The system was colonialism, under which

nations of Western Europe exercised, for their own benefit, control over underdeveloped areas, such as the Middle East. Thus the ancient land of Palestine was under British control between World War I and World War II.

Jewish people seeking refuge from discrimination and persecution in other parts of the world, mainly Eastern Europe, had already begun to establish themselves in Palestine by the time World War I broke out. During that war, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs favored making Palestine a national home for Jewish people as a matter of policy. When the British took over Palestine after the war, they carried out this policy. Thousands of Jews settled there.

The Palestinian Arabs were more than a little unhappy about the Jewish immigration. They, too, had believed that their right to the area would be protected by the British, whom they had helped during the war. They feared that they would become outnumbered and that they would lose their land.

After World War II, the Arabs' worst fears became reality. Many thousands of European Jews, their numbers reduced by two-thirds as a result of the Nazi extermination policy, wanted to go to Palestine. The Jews already there wanted them to come. In addition, many Jews wanted to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

The Arab countries in the Middle East united in opposition to the creation of a Jewish state. They viewed it as a leftover of the hated colonial system, an alien nation of mostly European immigrants displacing Arabs in the Arabs' own land. The British, caught in between, turned the matter over to the newly established United Nations.

In 1947 the U.N. voted to partition Palestine and make part of it a new nation, Israel. The Jews, however, thought they should have more territory than that voted by the U.N. The Arabs thought that there should be no Jewish state at all.

Israel was proclaimed a nation on May 14, 1948. A few hours later, the Arabs attacked.

In this military engagement, the Israelis proved stronger than the Arab nations. By the time the U.N. arranged an armistice agreement in January 1949, Israel had increased its territory by about half. But the Arabs still would not recognize the new nation. Instead, they did everything they could, short of another all-out war, to harass Israel. They shelled border areas and staged guerrilla raids against Israel's frontier settlements.

The Arabs justified such actions by pointing to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs who had been left homeless by the 1948 war. Israel would not let the refugees return to their homes on the grounds that they would only work from within to destroy Israel. They were forced to settle in poverty-stricken camps in various Arab countries, mostly in

Jordan. The majority of Arab guerrillas and terrorists who have been responsible for airport bombings and similar activities in recent years are Palestinians who grew up in these camps.

Poverty, however, can be found in many places besides the camps of Palestinian refugees. Like war, it is an old story throughout the Middle East. Though the region is rich in oil, the riches have not been evenly distributed, either geographically or socially. Only a few countries have large quantities of oil, and these countries have in the past used their oil wealth more for the enrichment of a few sheiks than for social improvements.

Egypt has not been one of the major oil producers. Its economy has been based more on agriculture, made possible as in ancient times by the Nile River. Another source of revenue was the Suez Canal, owned by a British-French company until 1956. It was that year that Egyptian President Gamal Nasser seized the Canal from the British and French and nationalized it.

The situation grew tense along the border between Egypt and Israel and the Israelis struck on October 29, 1956. They were soon joined by British and French forces, who were reacting to Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal.

In this case, the bipolar peacekeeping system worked swiftly to stop the fighting. Both superpowers condemned the attack on Egypt and voted together in the U.N. Security Council for a cease-fire. The fighting quickly ended, and a U.N. multinational peace force moved in to supervise the Israel-Egypt border.

The Middle East and Superpower Rivalry

After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the United States withdrew its financial support from an important Egyptian project, the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. The Soviet Union offered to replace U.S. support. The project was eventually completed in 1971, with Soviet aid, and has provided irrigation water to reclaim over a million acres of desert and turn them into cropland.

During the 1950s the Soviet Union also supplied weapons and military equipment to Egypt and to those Arab nations, or factions within nations, that were willing to side with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower responded by pledging American aid, troops if necessary, to the government of any Middle Eastern nation in danger of being taken over by Communists.

In May 1958, during a revolt in Lebanon, Eisenhower sent 5,000 U.S. Marines to that country. The revolt subsided, and the Marines left in October without seeing any action. Nevertheless, it was becoming clear

In 1958, President Eisenhower sent thousands of U.S. Marines into Lebanon to prevent the fall of a pro-Western government. Seven years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Marines into the Dominican Republic for the same reason.

that the Middle East *could* become the scene of a direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

Border clashes between Israel and various Arab countries continued during the early 1960s. The Soviet Union continued to supply the Arabs with tanks, planes, and other military equipment. Israel received a good deal of military aid from France—and some from the United States.

Then, on May 18, 1967, Egypt's President Nasser demanded that the United Nations pull out its peace force, which had been guarding the border between Egypt and Israel since the end of the fighting in 1956. The United Nations reluctantly agreed to comply with the demand. Nasser then closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, cutting off access to Israel's southern port of Elath.

The United Nations Security Council went into session as it had during the Suez crisis more than ten years before. But in 1967 bipolar antagonisms made agreement impossible as the Soviet Union sided with the Arabs and the United States with Israel. Since the two superpowers opposed each other, the Security Council could do nothing.

The Six-Day War

On June 5, 1967, the Arab nations of Jordan and Syria shelled Israeli settlements across the border. Such shellings had been common in recent years. But this time Israel struck back with massive force, not only at Jordan and Syria but also at Egypt. Thus began the third Arab-Israeli war in less than twenty years.

In a little more than five days, Israel smashed the Arabs with a lightning display of military power. Hundreds of Soviet-built Arab tanks and planes were destroyed and thousands of Arabs killed. The Israelis captured all of Jordan's land on the West Bank of the Jordan River, including the Old City of Jerusalem. They also gained the Golan Heights area of Syria and all of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, right up to the bank of the Suez Canal.

A U.N. cease-fire did not prevent further clashes during the next few years, especially between Egyptians and Israelis in the Suez Canal area. All the while, the Soviet Union continued to help the Arabs rebuild their forces, and sided with the Arabs in demanding that Israel return the territory won in 1967.

The Israelis remained sure of their position, sure that the Arabs could never mount an effective attack again, sure that the Soviet Union would eventually give up on the Arabs, and sure that the whole Middle East question would eventually be settled on Israeli terms.

But in October 1973 events occurred that not only shattered Israeli confidence—but also raised once more the possibility of superpower confrontation in the Middle East. In addition, a new factor was introduced into international politics: the oil embargo.

War and Confrontation

It was the afternoon of Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, the Jewish High Holy Day of Atonement. Fewer than a thousand Israeli soldiers manned the defense line along the Suez Canal. In the north, along the Syrian border, Israel had less than a hundred tanks with which to defend the Golan Heights. On this afternoon, the Arabs attacked.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war began when more than 800 Syrian tanks assaulted the Golan Heights. Along the Suez Canal, the Egyptians crossed at five places. Nearly 70,000 strong, the Egyptians quickly overran the Israeli positions. The Syrians almost, but not quite, took the Golan Heights. The Israelis could not dominate the air war as they had in 1967 because, this time, the Arabs had Soviet-made missiles with which to destroy Israeli planes.

Though taken almost completely by surprise, Israel recovered quickly. All reserves were immediately mobilized.

Within four days, the Israelis drove the Syrians off the Golan Heights. In another four days, they advanced to within eighteen miles—artillery range—of the Syrian capital of Damascus; this was as far as they chose to go. Meanwhile, the Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula were eventually able to stop the Egyptians. Yet, on both fronts, it was not the kind of lightning war that Israel likes to fight. Rather, it was more of a plodding, blow-by-blow slugging match.

Such a war, fought on open, barren terrain, proved enormously costly in equipment and in men. Israel's total population is only about 3,200,000. But, in the October war, in less than three weeks' time, Israel suffered more than 4,000 casualties. Of these, about 2,400 were killed. It was as if the United States, with its larger population, had suffered 250,000 casualties with 150,000 killed in three weeks.

In the early days of the war, the United States remained aloof. Then it became clear that the Soviet Union was resupplying the Arabs by airlift-

In October 1973, Egyptian tanks crossed the Suez Canal on quickly built bridges. The fourth war between Arabs and Israelis threatened to escalate into a large-scale conflict between the two superpowers.

ing equipment to both fronts. When the Soviet Union announced it was going to assist the Arabs in recapturing the territory they had lost in 1967, the United States began to resupply Israel with military equipment.

The way the fighting was going at first—grinding slowly on, eating up equipment and men—there was some question as to how long both sides could continue to fight. Would Israel, for example, try to end the fighting quickly with atomic weapons (which some people thought Israel possessed)? If so, what would the Soviet Union do? What would the United States do?

Then, too, how long could the superpowers themselves keep pouring material into the war without becoming directly involved? Already, there had been signs that Soviet advisers were on the scene to help the Arabs. Suppose American advisers also went to the front?

Luckily, things never reached this stage. On the ninth day of the fighting, Israeli forces were able to cross the Suez Canal and establish a bridgehead on the other side—the Egyptian side. This bridgehead was gradually expanded, until it became obvious that the Israelis would soon be able to outflank the Egyptians and bring the war to a rapid conclusion, as in 1967.

At this point, the Soviet Union began advising Egypt and Syria that they had gained all they could militarily. At the same time, foreign ministers from other Arab countries asked the United States to take a hand in mediating the conflict. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow for talks with Leonid Brezhnev.

The two superpowers then asked for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Their jointly sponsored cease-fire resolution asked all combatants to stop fighting and remain where they were. Twelve hours after the resolution passed, it was accepted by both Egypt and Israel.

Though quickly accepted, it was just as quickly violated. Fighting continued through October 24, with the Israelis winning. They surrounded the Egyptian city of Suez and trapped a large part of Egypt's Third Army.

The United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to stop the fighting before the Israelis completely defeated the Arabs. But now it looked as if the Israelis would go ahead and try to gain a complete victory anyway. To the Soviet Union, this meant either that the United States was not keeping its word or that the Americans were unable to make the Israelis stop fighting.

The Egyptian President put the blame entirely on Israel, and asked *both* the United States and the Soviet Union to send troops to supervise the cease-fire. The United States rejected this appeal, fearing that if both Soviet and American troops were in the area, the chances of "incidents" would be too great.

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The Soviet Union, however, accepted the Egyptian idea. And the note that Secretary Brezhnev sent to President Nixon went further. In this note, he informed the United States that, if the Americans would not join in enforcing the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would send its own troops to the war zone anyway. It was a harsh note. Its language was not that of *détente*, but the blunt language of the Cold War.

There were many ways to interpret this note. For example, had the Soviet Union really wanted to send its troops into the Middle East all along? Had the Soviets gotten Egypt to ask for troops just to give them an excuse to establish a Soviet military presence in the area?

As in the Cuban missile crisis eleven years before, how each side perceived the other's motives was extremely important. And, indeed, when the United States put its military forces on a world-wide stand-by alert, it seemed for a short time that another Cuban missile crisis might be in the making.

Instead, both superpowers quickly backed off. They agreed finally to a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Middle East which would include neither American nor Soviet troops. Meanwhile the Soviet Union put pressure on the Egyptians, and the United States put pressure on the Israelis, to obey the cease-fire.

In January 1974, Egypt and Israel accepted a temporary agreement arranged by the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. According to this agreement, the Israelis would withdraw to the east side of the Suez Canal, and the U.N. peacekeeping force would set up a demilitarized zone between Egyptians and Israelis. The zone would be patrolled by U.N. troops. In June 1974, a similar type of agreement was reached between Syria and Israel.

Those were temporary agreements only. Difficult problems still remained to be worked out—the most difficult of all being the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees. But almost as difficult was the problem of how much territory captured by Israel in the 1967 war would be returned to the Arab countries.

Such problems *have* to be solved. If the atmosphere of *détente* between the superpowers is to be preserved—with no more incidents like the near-confrontation of October 1973—permanent peace in the Middle East is vital. On that point, there is little disagreement.

Oil as a Political Weapon

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war did more than produce a near-confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also led to an economic crisis in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Without oil, modern technology comes to a standstill, and the Middle

East produces a large part of the world's oil. In the past, the oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, though supporting the Arab cause, had not done much to back up that support. But in 1973 Saudi Arabia took the lead in establishing an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and other countries which supported Israel. The action abruptly introduced a new element into the bipolar system.

Japan and the countries of Western Europe, now emerging as power centers in the international system, are almost totally dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The oil embargo was much more keenly felt in those countries than in the United States, which has almost 10 percent of the world's crude-oil reserves. Thus, the embargo affected relations between the United States and countries which, supposedly, were its allies in the bipolar system.

In this instance, the NATO countries of Europe put their own national interests above that of maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. When the United States tried to supply Israel with military equipment from NATO stocks kept in Western Europe, the NATO countries opposed the move. Very simply, they were afraid to risk having Arab countries cut off their oil.

The 1973 crisis in the Middle East raised significant questions about the bipolar system. It showed, for example, that if Western Europe had to choose between oil and support for American policies, oil had to be more important. Might the Soviet Union, at some time in the future, try to exploit such a situation for its own political advantage? Countries of Eastern Europe, moreover, are rich in coal; might this resource become a weapon through which these nations might win independence from Soviet influence?

Bipolarity—in the Middle East as elsewhere—is obviously not the clear-cut system it once was. Today it is a system in flux.

Examining the Case

1. Trace the escalation/de-escalation process in the Middle East crisis from October 6, 1973 to January 1974. Did the superpowers behave more or less responsibly in this situation then they did in the Cuban crisis?

2. How were the basic antagonisms between Israel and the Arab states affected by the Cold War?

3. How do the Arabs and Israelis perceive each other? What effects do these perceptions have on the possible long-range solution of the Middle East conflict? Could the superpowers affect these perceptions?

Evaluating the System

1. What do you think the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 demonstrated about the ability of the superpowers to regulate conflicts between lesser powers? What do you think that war showed about the dangers of the bipolar system, even at a time when relations between the superpowers are relatively friendly?

2. In this case—and the other cases in this book—what was demonstrated about the peacekeeping role of the United Nations in a bipolar world? What changes do you think would be necessary for the U.N. to play a more meaningful peacekeeping role?

3. Under the present system, can the question of war or peace be decided on any grounds other than national interests and domestic politics? Why?

4. Explain why you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Despite the increase in armaments, the two superpowers are actually less powerful today than they were fifteen years ago, in terms of their control over people and events and other nations."

5. Suppose that, within the next decade, there are three or four "superpowers" and more than twenty countries with at least some nuclear weapons. Would "crisis situations" become more or less likely than under the bipolar system?

Issues and Topics for Further Exploration

1. American responses in recent years to liberation movements in Latin America, in Southeast Asia and in Africa.

2. The emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a significant political force in the Middle East and how this will affect both the bipolar system and the future of the Middle East.

The Cold War

THE FUTURE

The Cold War: 1974

1974 — Arab oil-producing nations end the oil embargo. Charging higher prices for their oil exports, Arab oil-producers increase their financial investments in the United States and other NATO countries.

— U.S. Senators Jacob Javits and Claiborne Pell of the Foreign Relations Committee make a fact-finding trip to Cuba and confer with Fidel Castro.

— Despite growing support among Latin American countries for restoring ties with Cuba, an OAS resolution to end the anti-Cuba embargo fails by two votes.

— The U.N. General Assembly—with support from the Soviet bloc, China, and many Third World nations—adopts two resolutions favoring sovereignty of the Palestinian Arabs under the spokesmanship of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

— During a visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. President Gerald Ford meets with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The two superpower leaders reach a tentative agreement to limit the production of long-range offensive missiles and bombers.

World Order: What Next?

The end of the first chapter of this book raised the question: "What should the world be like in the future?"

In the three subsequent case studies, you saw how U.S.-Soviet relations have changed during three decades of the Cold War. You watched a "tight" bipolar system become "looser" as Third World nations, China, and regional blocs have grown in influence. What do these changes suggest about the future?

No one can be certain what the world will be like in the future. Yet we all try to make educated guesses. Such guesses are usually based on current trends. However, political leaders, students, business people, farmers, parents—all of us need some idea of what the future *could* be in order to help bring about the future that *should* be.

One such future might bring into being a world order based on the values listed in the Foreword of this book. You have seen how the bipolar system has operated in terms of *limiting violence and preventing war*. But what of the other values?

How have such groups as the Palestinian refugees fared in terms of *social justice* and *economic welfare*?

How have such groups as the Hungarian Freedom Fighters fared in terms of *political participation*?

Indeed, how can all the people of the world expect to enjoy an *ecological balance of the global environment* when nuclear-arms testing and chemical warfare are keys to power in the international system?

What changes in the world order might strengthen these values in the future?

The discussion that follows will focus on recent trends in the bipolar system and raise some questions to help you think about how these trends might affect the future. In the next section, you will have a chance to consider some alternative international systems and whether they might further the achievement of desirable values in a world order of the future.

The Future of Détente

The harsh struggles of the Cold War have been modified in recent years by *détente*. Will *détente* continue?

The Soviet Union has benefited economically and technologically from cooperation with the United States. The United States has been relatively free of the domestic discord that marked the years of the Vietnam war. Both nations—and particularly the United States—now seem interested in playing the role of world peacekeeper.

If *détente* between the two nations continues, what will the world be like in the 1980s? Will it consist of two blocs of nations in "friendly rivalry"? Will the bitter antagonisms of the Cold War fade away?

China in the Future

A major factor in the world order of the future will be the People's Republic of China. Considered underdeveloped and isolated in the 1950s, China has recently moved into a prominent position on the world stage. While increasingly asserting its independence of the Soviet Union among Communist nations, China has improved its relations with the United States.

Will China emerge as a superpower in its own right? Will China become a "third pole" around which the developing nations of Africa and Asia will cluster? What role do Chinese leaders envision for their country in the 1980s?

Commodity Producers in the Future

The oil-producing nations of the Middle East clearly demonstrated their new-found power during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Their subsequent distribution and pricing policies contributed to an alarming rate of inflation in most nations of the world—rich and poor alike.

Will the Arab nations be able to use their economic clout to become yet another power center in an international system now in flux? Are the Arab

nations sufficiently united politically to use their power effectively? Would such an effective power center be likely to produce a more just and peaceful world order?

What might happen if other commodity producers--such as the copper-producing countries of Africa and South America—join together to control the pricing and distribution of other essential products for political and economic reasons? What new tensions might such actions create in the international system? How might the economic well-being of the world's peoples be affected?

Nationalism and Liberation Movements in the Future

The crises described in each of the three case studies displayed the force of nationalism. Since World War II many former colonies have gained political independence. Others such as South West Africa (Namibia) are still struggling for it. Some nations are fighting for economic independence from the big powers. Groups called "liberation forces" within nations are striving for social justice from their own governments. Many observers believe that nationalism and liberation movements will continue to be strong forces in world politics. How will the superpowers react to these forces? What would be the most desirable policy for them to adopt?

Nuclear Weapons in the Future

In 1945 the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons.
In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb.
In 1957 Great Britain exploded its first hydrogen bomb.
In 1960 France exploded its first nuclear device.
In 1964 China exploded its first atomic bomb.

By now several more nations have joined the nuclear club—and the membership seems destined to grow.

Experts fear that a small nation, or a terrorist group, or even a handful of determined individuals could steal poorly guarded nuclear materials —and manufacture their own bomb.

How could the spread of nuclear weapons affect the international system of the future? Could the "mutual deterrence" of the two superpowers continue to operate when many nations have nuclear weapons? Is "mutual deterrence" a desirable principle upon which to base future world security?

Choosing the Future

Clearly the bipolar system is changing. What is it changing into? What other international system might eventually take its place? What kind of system should we try to bring into being?

A Concert of the World

Some people suggest that the bipolar world is evolving into a "multipolar" world. They foresee a "Concert of the World" which would operate like the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. Following decades of wars and revolutions, several of the strongest European nations established the Concert of Europe to cooperate in keeping the peace and in stemming the tide of revolutionary change. With a few exceptions, major wars were avoided in Europe for almost a century—from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the outbreak of World War I (1914).

A Concert of the World might include five power centers: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe. These five major power centers could cooperate to keep the peace.

Leaders of these nations might welcome an international system that would avoid major wars as well as the expense and risks of an escalating arms race. A Concert of the World would not require fundamental changes in the present international system—or in the domestic system of each major power.

How would nations of the Third World be affected by a five-power Concert of the World? Would such a system increase the likelihood of

An international peacekeeping force—U.N. troops sent to the Middle East to prevent a recurrence of fighting.

social justice, economic welfare, human rights, and political participation for people everywhere? Would national rivalries among five superpowers eventually weaken or break up such a Concert?

A Limited World Government

One alternative to the Concert of the World might be a limited world government that would truly represent all the peoples of the world. In such a limited world government, the troops and arms of individual nations would be transferred to a world organization as a peace force. Those who favor this type of system, such as the United World Federalists, feel that it could protect the interests of all nations and provide the best assurance of peace.

But what about all the individuals and minorities in the various nations?

Would a limited world government be more effective than a five-power Concert in expanding and preserving social justice, economic welfare, and political participation for them?

Other Alternative Futures

Many other ideas have been proposed for a world political system of the future. Some proposals call for a more powerful world government than the United World Federalists propose. Some proposals even call for a system of non-violent world anarchy—with no government, no armed forces, and no police.

Seven very specific and very different proposals have been prepared by the World Order Models Project made up of teams of people in different parts of the world. These teams spent six years in planning world models of the future. (Further information about these models is available from the Institute for World Order.)

There are many alternatives and proposals to study. But how do we choose among them?

Preferred World

A very important way of thinking about the future—sometimes called a "preferred world"—is based upon values as well as facts. It is absolutely essential to have a clear concept of a preferred world to participate in creating the future. Rather than waiting for the future to unravel without plan or purpose, we must decide what kind of future we want.

Difficult problems arise when the future we want is greatly different from the probable future emerging from present trends. Those who want a world of peace and justice, for example, are disturbed by present trends of continued weapons development, environmental deterioration, and the acute human suffering of mass starvation and political repression.

Choosing the Future

If you had to choose between a Concert of the World and a representative or limited world government, which would you prefer?

- In thinking through this problem, first review the three cases discussed in this book. Under the bipolar system, what happened in Hungary in 1956? In Cuba in 1962? In the Middle East in 1973?

- Under a Concert of the World, what do you think would have happened in Hungary in 1956? in Cuba in 1962? in the Middle East in 1973?

- Under a limited world government, what do you think would have happened in Hungary in 1956? In Cuba in 1962? In the Middle East in 1973?

Next you should consider whether a Concert of the World or a limited world government is more practical. Which would be easier to achieve? What steps would be necessary to bring about each of these systems?

Perhaps you will decide that one of these international systems would be more practical but less desirable—and that the other would be more desirable but less practical.

Perhaps you will decide that one of these systems would be more effective in peacekeeping, and the other more effective in carrying out principles of social justice. Perhaps you will decide that neither of the two alternatives would achieve all five of the desirable world-order values. In fact, a careful study of *all* currently discussed alternative systems might lead you to conclude that still another alternative must be invented.

What kind of future do we *want*? What kind of future *can* we achieve and *how* can we achieve it? *Will* Earth's people go beyond the Cold War and bring about a preferred world?

Key Concepts

Balance of power: Equality of strength between and among world powers in the international system—in a bipolar world, equality between two superpowers. Such equality is measured not only in terms of a balance of military power, but in terms of economic and technological strength, as well as that indefinable yet important quality called prestige. Attempts to maintain this balance have been reflected in the arms race.

Bipolarity: Domination of the international system by two centers of power. Since World War II, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union, both superpowers, have competed with each other to attract other nations into their spheres of power and influence. This situation contrasts with that of other periods, as during the 1930s, in which there have been several major centers of international power.

Coexistence: The policy of peaceful competition between the ideologies of the superpowers. Each ideology and economic system is to be judged on its merits and thus win converts. This policy eliminates both the need for hot war and some of the extreme measures of the Cold War.

Cold War: The struggle for power and influence throughout the world between the Communist nations and the capitalist nations, which began after World War II. Called the Cold War because it did not lead to direct and open warfare, this struggle has centered around the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Détente: A relaxing of international tension. Since the late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union have made periodic efforts at *détente*. Improved relations have decreased the tension and competition of the earlier years of the Cold War.

Escalation: Step-by-step worsening of a conflict to the severe-crisis stage. In a bipolar world, a minor conflict may arise between two small nations—where the interests of the two superpowers are involved on opposite sides. Then there is the danger that the crisis might escalate into armed conflict, or even nuclear warfare, between the superpowers themselves.

Intervention: Interference in the affairs of a nation by another nation or group of nations, or by an international organization. The interference may be military, or it may be economic or political or ideological. Both superpowers have intervened in the affairs of other nations to protect their own interests.

Mutual deterrence: The theory that, if two or more powers armed with nuclear weapons have the power to destroy each other—no matter which one attacks first—then each will hold back from attacking the other. Thus peace will be maintained between them.

Nationalism: Identification with the special interests of one's national group or nation-state—most apparent in efforts to attain and protect independence from foreign powers or alien cultures. This force has been exploited at times by the superpowers. At other times it has been an impediment to their complete control of certain peoples.

Perception/Misperception: Interpretation or misinterpretation by national leaders of each other's motives, interests, and capabilities. The public utterances of the leaders of the superpowers as well as of the press have tended to depict the motives and behavior of the opposing power in negative terms. Communication has also been limited, making it difficult to perceive real motives and actual behavior. Escalation is sometimes the result of misperception.

Power bloc: A group of nations, allied through common interests and/or treaties, which often act as a single force in world politics. In the bipolar system there are three major blocs: the Eastern Communist nations, the Western capitalist nations, and the nonaligned or "Third World" nations.

Rebellion: An open defiance of or refusal to obey authority or submit to those in power. Rebellions usually involve force such as violent demonstrations and guerrilla warfare. There is in many parts of the world a spirit of rebellion against the superpowers as well as against the former European colonial powers. Rebellions are sometimes referred to as uprisings or insurgencies.

Revolution: A sudden and significant change of circumstance, such as to a new government or a new social, economic, or political system. Some rebellions which succeed become revolutions. The Cuban "insurgency" became the Cuban revolution when Castro introduced a socialist state. Although the Hungarian uprising of 1956 is sometimes called a revolution, the change in government lasted so few days that it can hardly be so classified. Many people believe that the establishment of a just and peaceful world order would be "revolutionary."

Sphere of interest: A geographical region more or less dominated by a powerful nation and generally recognized as important to its military or economic interests. Thus, Latin America is considered within the United States sphere of interest, just as Eastern Europe is in the Soviet sphere.

Superpower: A nation with such great economic and military power that it can play a decisive role in international events. The United States and the Soviet Union are two such nations. Many observers suggest that the People's Republic of China should also be considered a superpower.

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"Help Hungary! Help! Help! Help!" is the desperate radio message from Hungarian writers as Soviet tanks roll into their national capital...

Many Americans and others, fearing that the U.S. naval "quarantine" of Cuba will lead to nuclear war, begin preparing bomb shelters...

When war erupts for the fourth time in the Middle East, the United States supplies military equipment to Israel, and the Soviet Union supplies military equipment to the Arabs...

The people involved in these conflicts are caught up in an international system called bipolarity: Two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--dominate world politics and compete for the allegiance of the world's other nations.

The authors of this book examine three dramatic crises of the Cold War era: the Hungarian rebellion of 1956; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Through these case studies the book raises some significant issues:

- Is bipolarity an effective system for keeping peace?
- What is happening to the bipolar system in today's world?
- What kind of changes in the international system would be most likely to limit violence and prevent war?

"Rather than waiting for the future to unravel without plan or purpose," say the authors of this book, "we must decide what kind of future we want."

Other titles:

Peacekeeping — The Struggle for Human Rights
Can We Eliminate War? — A Question of Values
War Criminals, War Victims
Andersonville, Nuremberg, Hiroshima, My Lai

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